gical connection (vyāpti) had motivated the late Kumārila to reformulate his ideas on the logical connection in the Bṛhaṭṭīkā can therefore be abandoned. 3 In K 2007, Kiyotaka Yoshimizu shows that in the other fragments that can be attributed to the Bṛhaṭṭīkā, Kumārila "seems to be attempting to slough off Dignāga's influence, which had earlier dominated his thoughts on logic" (K 2007: 1096) . The term avinābhāvaniyama, finally, is the subject of an appendix (K 2007: 1096-1100) . It is the interpretation of this term by both authors (K 2007 and Ch forthc., Appendix 1) that I call into question.
4
According to Dharmakīrti, inference (anumāna) is the basis of all discriminating judgment, 5 and the logical reason or evidence (hetu) is its basic element. The definition of this element and its corollaries can be 3 To my knowledge, Frauwallner drew this historical hypothesis from his interpretation of the first two stanzas of the "niyama fragment" (PVSVṬ 87,21-24; cf. Frauwallner 1962: 88) . Frauwallner concluded (ibid., p. 89) that Kumārila, in the first stanza, after rejecting the proposals of other teachers for the "relation" (sambandha) which exists as the foundation of a logical connection, introduces a new term, namely "necessary connection (notwendige Verbindung)" (niyama). With this translation of the term Frauwallner expresses his understanding of the fact that Kumārila assumed the notion of necessity to be implied in the new term. In the second stanza, Frauwallner sees the rejected relations to be indicated by the examples of "the relationship between cause and effect, etc." (kāryakāraṇabhāvādi), and interprets these as referring to the two types of relations proposed by Dharmakīrti, namely causality (tadutpatti) and real identity (tādātmya), an interpretation I followed in 1997: 634, n. 28, a. This interpretation is wrong. Kiyotaka Yoshimizu found at least one passage in the Tantravārttika where Kumārila mentions examples for types of relevant relationships, "such as causal relation, the relation between owner and possession, and the going together" (avinābhāvo hy aneka kāryakāraṇasvasvāmisahacarabhāvādiprabhedabhinnaḥ, TV II p. 43,16; cf. K 2007 : 1098 . It is evidently these relationships as propounded in the logic of the Ṣaṣṭitantra (cf. Frauwallner 1958: 123 and 126) that Kumārila refers to, not Dharmakīrti's. -This new historical aspect has no consequence for the more general question of the sequence of Kumārila's works. In regard to the solution of this problem, recent contributions by Kataoka (cf. Kataoka 2003a , 2003b Dharmakīrti's definition, when analyzed in a straight and natural way, as well as in accordance with the main commentators, 9 comprises four statements, of which only the first three are actually dealt with in this work: (1) a definition (lakṣaṇa) of the logical reason, (2) the restriction of its number (saṅkhyāniyama), (3) the cause for the restriction of its number (saṅkhyāniyamakāraṇa), and (4), in contrast, the absence (of the predicate "reason") in properties not so defined. The first three statements are also a dominant mark of the development in logical theory from Dignāga to Dharmakīrti in the sense that the first is based on Dignāga's definition, while the second and third introduce Dharmakīrti's new theory of the three kinds of reason together with the ontic foundation for their being only three in number. It is, therefore, necessary to unequivocally understand these three statements.
My present translation 10 of PV 1.1 runs:
The (logical) reason is a property of the subject pervaded by a(nother property as) part of this (subject). This (reason) is only of three kinds because the inseparable (logical) connection is restricted (to these three kinds of reason). (Reasons) other than this (threefold reason) are spurious reasons.
11
6 This hypothetical name is Frauwallner's proposal. The text was later incorporated into the Pramāṇavārttika as the first chapter, with its prose text considered as Dharmakīrti's own commentary on the stanzas. Frauwallner's explanation of the character and literary fate of this early work (cf. Frauwallner 1954) is now generally ac cepted.
7 PV 1.1. He repeats this beginning in the Hetubindu, the first work in the history of Indian philosophy with logic properly speaking as its main subject.
8 This opening stanza, moreover, serves as a summary of the following treatise (śāstraśarīra) which, roughly, develops by explaining the definition (PVSV 1,12-2,14), the three kinds of a logical reason in general (2,14-3,9) and in detail (3, (9) (10) 12) , and the restriction of the inseparable logical connection to these three kinds as being based on the two essential connections (svabhāvapratibandha) of causality and real identity (10, (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 13) , as well as their ascertainment (20,14ff.) , before the first lengthy digression on the theory of concepts (24, 5) creates the structural imbalances characteristic for this early work of Dharmakīrti.
9 Cf. PVṬ 7a6-7b1 = PVSVṬ 8, 24-29. Cf. also HBṬ 9,25f. (and Steinkellner 1967: 82f., n. 4 According to my understanding, the term "inseparable connection" (avi nā bhāva) in PV 1.1 designates the logical nexus between two concepts or essences C . 12 This inseparable connection is based, with Dharmakīrti, on "essential connections" (svabhāvapratibandha), i.e., on either "causality" (tadutpatti) or "real identity" (tādātmya).
13 Thus, the inseparable connection is not the same as its ontic foundation. But the ontic foundation "restricts" (ni√yam) the inseparable connection (in the sense of "being inseparably connected") only to such concepts that are related to instances of reality which are connected by essence or nature. And insofar as it is restricted by such an ontic foundation, the inseparable connection of these concepts is also a necessary one. 14 12 Cf. Steinkellner 1971: 201ff . In a German translation (under preparation) of the sections on logic in Dharmakīrti's first work (PVSV 1, 15 and 93, 14) , I try a single translation of the term svabhāva. Earlier, I translated the two main meanings in Dharmakīrti's relevant usage by "essence" ("Wesen") and "essential property" ("wesentliche Beschaffenheit"). Now I use only "essence" ("Wesen"). Since the different meanings of Dharmakīrti's term in dependence on the context are nowadays widely accepted, there is no further need to identify the different meanings by way of different translation terms. A single translation may be a better way to mirror the semantic powers of Dharmakīrti's term more appropriately in the future. For the sake of clarity, however, I add a superscript N or C (in German N or B) for "nature" or "concept" ("Natur" or "Begriff ") to indicate the ontological or logical meaning respectively. Where the term svabhāva does not occur in one of these specifically differentiated functions, it is not marked by these superscripts.
13 I also now prefer the translation "real identity" ("Realidentität") for tādātmya and tadātmatva. The translation "identity" is sometimes mistaken to mean "formal, logical identity." I therefore use the translation "real identity" to indicate the fact that two concepts refer to one and the same instance of reality.
14 E.g., in the conclusion of the first part (PVSV 6, 15 ) of a section (PVSV 6,22-10,12) where he shows that there are only the above-mentioned three kinds of a correct logical reason (hetu) and subsequently explains how and why other reasons in use are either included or not included in one of these three kinds, Dharmakīrti says: "Therefore no other reason (than one of these three kinds) is conclusive (gamaka), because for an (inferential indicator) whose essence N is not connected (with the indicated) there is no restriction of an inseparable connection (to one of these three)" (tena nānyo hetur gama ko 'sti, apratibaddhasvabhāvasyāvinābhāvaniyamābhāvāt) (PVSV 8,12f.). That means: if a proving property is not connected with a property to be proved by an "essential connection" (svabhāvapratibandha), i.e., a connection in reality, there is no restriction of an inseparable (logical) connection to the former, and therefore the presumed proving property is not conclusive. In other words, this conclusion gives a reason for the fact that only a logical reason of one of the three kinds can be considered as conclusive, namely that the inseparable connection (avinābhāva) cannot be restricted (niyamābhāvāt) to a property which is not essentially connected with another property (cf. also the argument in PV 1.32 below, and NB 2.20).
I am also of the opinion that the compound avinābhāvaniyama has the same meaning and purpose 15 in its three occurrences in PV 1.1 and 31, 16 15 This is denied for PV 1.31 in Dunne 2004: 150f., n. 16, on the grounds that it "would require us to carry forward (through anuvṛtti) the reference to only three reliable forms of evidence from PV I.1, for the discussion surrounding PV I.31 itself does not allow for even an implicit reference to the restriction (niyama) of avinābhāva to only three forms of evidence." In my opinion, however, Dunne only fails to recognize the admittedly complex texture of Dharmakīrti's preceding presentation: In fact, the śās traśarīra stanza of PV 1.1 introduces the topics of the reason's definition (treated in PVSV 1,12-2,14), its three kinds (treated in PVSV 3,9-10,12), as well as the cause for this restricted number (treated in PVSV 10,13-20,13). And it is the treatment of this third topic which is summarized in PV 1.31. There is, therefore, clearly a direct connection between this summary and the three kinds of reasons explained.
16 The two stanzas of PV 1.31f. are called antaraśloka in the sense of "stanzas carrying on," because both, on the one hand, summarize the preceding presentation of the theory of the essential connection (PVSV 10, (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 13) , and on the other, introduce the following explanation of their restricting function and their ascertainment (PVSV 20, 14ff. Steinkellner 1997: 642) . For the problem of Dharmakīrti's usage of the term "essence N " (svabhāva) in this stanza and its contextual position see my attempt to explain it in 1997: 627ff. In the following stanza PV 1.32, Dharmakīrti supports the assertion that the inseparable logical connection is restricted to certain kinds of properties applicable as logical reasons due to one of the two essential connections with a prasaṅga-like argument: if such an essential connection in the form of causality were not available (anyathā), there would be no necessary occurrence (avaśyambhāva) of some entirely different property such as an "effect" as the reason with likewise different properties in a cause (cf. PV 1.2a-c'), or, if an essential connection were not available in the form of real identity, there would be no necessary occurrence of a property of something with other properties caused by a different cause. It is not possible, e.g., to infer the property "being of yellow colour" which is caused by the addition of saffron (cf. PVSVṬ 89,9) from "being cloth." PV 1. I admit that the switch from avinābhāva in PV 1.31 to avaśyambhāva in PV1.32 is cause for irritation, as noticed by the Yoshimizus. Chizuko Yoshimizu, therefore, proposes to take the word bhāva as "referring to a state or mode modified by the indeclinable avinā or the adverb avaśyam" (Ch forthc., Appendix 1). She thus understands avaśyambhāva as "necessity," but is then forced to supply in her translation "the necessity [of being so] as subject". Kiyotaka Yoshimizu seems to consider the term as a synonym of avinābhāva (K 2007: 1098f.) . I would agree with the latter in a modified as well as in PVSV 8,12f. (cf. n. 14). As for the analysis of the compound, I preferred in 1997 to follow Dharmakīrti's statement in his later Hetubindu 17 (which I still understand as an explanation of the specific meaning of the terms niyama and niyata in this context) as well as the mainstream commentators' interpretation of it as a genitive-tatpuruṣa, and tried to indicate a motive for Karṇakagomin's divergent interpretation of the compound as a karmadhāraya.
18
It is in an appendix to his second paper 19 that Kiyotaka Yoshimizu proposes -as the basis for his "conjecture" (K 2007: 1098) regarding Dharmakīrti's intentions -another interpretation of the compound. He takes the compound to be a locative-tatpuruṣa, and accordingly proposes a new translation of the causal clause avinābhāvaniyamāt in PV 1.1: 20 "The (logical reason) is only of three kinds because of the restricway: Although "the necessary (avaśyam) occurrence (bhāva), i.e., of one with another," is not exactly synonymous with "the non-occurrence (of one) without (the other)" (a vinābhāva), the meaning of the former is certainly implied in the latter, with the difference that the notion of necessity is expressed. 17 HB 5,8f.: "This (inseparable connection) does not occur in a (property) other than the threefold reason [i.e., in one of the three kinds of reason respectively]. Thus it is said to be restricted only to this (threefold reason)" (sa trividhād dhetor anyatra nāstīty atraiva ni ya ta ucyate). Cf. Steinkellner 1967: 99, n. I.62. This explanation of a restriction to some thing (atraiva niyataḥ) as equivalent to the exclusion of its occurrence elsewhere (sa … anyatra nāsti) is also reflected in PVSV 8,12: … nānyaḥ … asti (cf. above n. 14). Moreover, although I could not find a passage in the mass of commentarial material collected in Iwata 1991 where the compound is analyzed, I think that Dharmakīrti's formulation of the logical reason sahopalambhaniyamāt (PVin 1.54ab) is exactly parallel to the present case, and in PVin 1. 40,2f. we find again a parallel explanation of the meaning of ni yama: na hi … anyopalambho 'sti (cf. Iwata 1991: I/104). While not being able to refer to a single traditional explanation of this compound as a genitive-tatpuruṣa, I find that throughout Iwata's comprehensive survey of the commentarial tradition I can only understand it as being used as such a compound. In all its occurrences the term niyama denotes the meaning of the particle eva in its exclusive function (anyayogavyavaccheda, cf. PV 4.190ff. = PVin 2.10ff.; Kajiyama 1998: 57f., n. 132; Gillon -Hayes 1982).
18 Cf. Steinkellner 1997: 629-634 (for other views on this compound cf. Dunne 2004: 150f., n. 16). While I agree with Kiyotaka Yoshimizu when he says "I hold Karṇakagomin's chronological assumption to coincide with the historical truth" (K 2007: 1097, n. 62) -the "chronological assumption" being the view that Dharmakīrti substitutes Kumārila's niyama with his own avinābhāva -, as well as with his rejection of Karṇakagomin's kar ma dhāraya-explanation of the compound avinābhāvaniyama, I think the reasons given for the latter are wrong (cf. below). 19 K 2007: 1096-1100. 20 K 2007: 1097, n. 62; and 1098, n. 65 . Cf. also Ch forthc.: Appendix 1. It is not clear to me which one of the two came up with the idea of this analysis first. Chizuko Yoshimizu proposes it still "by way of an experiment" for both compounds avinābhāvaniyama and avaśyambhāvaniyama, while Kiyotaka Yoshimizu seems to "propose" it in a more assured
tion [of the nature of a thing by other things] to the inseparable connection [of the former with the latter]" (my emphasis).
The kind of restriction he considers to be meant here is the "spatiotemporal restriction" (deśakālaniyama), 21 the development of which has been treated in detail by Chizuko Yoshimizu with regard to Dharmakīr-ti's "Sautrāntika" background.
22 As made particularly clear in AKBh 130,23f. (cf. Ch 2007 : 1058 , the spatio-temporal restrictions are factual features of all objects to be observed; on account of this restriction, an appropriate efficacy (sāmarthya) of the causes can be recognized (dṛṣṭa), i.e., can be inferred, since no such restriction would be possible without a corresponding restricting cause.
According to Kiyotaka Yoshimizu, "Avinābhāvaniyama is the restriction (niyama) of the nature of a particular thing by other things; on the basis of that restriction the former is proved inseparable (a-vinā) from the latter" (K 2007: 1097, n. 62) . Thus, he dismisses the option of a genitive-tatpuruṣa "because that which is to be restricted is not the logical connection, but an instance of reality, the nature of which is determined by another instance" (ibid.). In Kiyotaka Yoshimizu's opinion, Dharmakīrti "thereby revises the restriction (niyama) that Kumārila found in two coexisting things and considered it to be the foundation of a logical connection" (K 2007: 1097) . But while Kumārila does not specify the type of relationship he names niyama, Dharmakīrti "ontologically confines it to two kinds, namely, identity (tādātmya) and causality (tadutpatti)" (K 2007: 1098) . In other words, according to Kiyotaka Yoshimizu, the relevant causes provide the restriction (niyama) of the nature of an effect to its being inseparably connected with something else.
In my opinion, however, this kind of spatio-temporal restriction cannot be adduced in a semantic interpretation of the term niyama in Dharmakīrti's compound. In Kumārila's Bṛhaṭṭīkā, niyama has been substituted as a synonym for avinābhāva and vyāpti, referring to the inseparable logical connection in the Ślokavārttika. In Dharmakīrti's compound, however, the term niyama is used neither in Kumārila's manner. He finds Karṇakagomin's karmadhāraya-explanation "inappropriate" on the basis of his own niyama-interpretation, but does not offer an explanation for Karṇa-kagomin's choice.
21 Dharmakīrti will extend the range of causal capacities also to the restrictions of "material" aspects (dravya, vastu) (cf. Ch 2007 Ch : 1060 Ch -1063 sense 23 nor in the specific sense of a "spatio-temporal restriction," but in its general meaning of "restriction, limitation," i.e., to indicate the formal cause or criterion (nimitta) for the application of the word "only" (eva) in regard to something.
The interpretation of avinābhāvaniyama as a genitive-tatpuruṣa 24 is supported by the mainstream commentators, 25 except for Karṇakagomin and, possibly, Śaṅkaranandana. I still think that my understanding (cf. 1997: 632ff.) of Karṇakagomin's interpretation of the compound as a karmadhāraya 26 (PVSVṬ 87,18ff.) is correct. It is an attempt to counter Kumārila's usage of the word niyama for the logical nexus by indicating the avinābhāva, this time in its ontological sense, as the proper representative of this nexus.
27
In addition to the above attempt to understand the compound in a way consistent with Dharmakīrti's basic ideas on the logical nexus, a methodological side-remark, not to be slighted as an argument, may not be out of place: It is always possible to propose an interpretation on the basis of an established historical context in contradiction to commentarial traditions. But in such cases one is obliged to indicate the reasons for the different explanations found in the commentaries. In the present case, it will not be an easy task to find a motive on the part of the mainstream commentators for their allegedly divergent interpretation of the compound as a genitive-tatpuruṣa.
As a matter of fact, no less than three different meanings of the term niyama seem to be used by the parties involved in the present discussion: (1) niyama as the restrictive activity of causes, (2) niyama as indicating 23 As proposed by Karṇakagomin when he interprets the compound as a karma dhā ra ya.
24 Cf. Steinkellner 1997: 629-634. 25 To Steinkellner 1997: 630, n. 16 , further passages from Arcaṭa may now be added, e.g., HBṬ 10,1ff. (kiṃ kāraṇam. avinābhāvaniyamāt. avinābhāvasya vyāptes trividha eva pakşa dharme niyamāt), HBṬ 11,10-13 (avinābhāvasyātraiva trividha eva trirūpa eva ca hetau niyamād anyatra … avinābhāvābhāvād ity arthaḥ), HBṬ 55,8ff. (atraiva … trivi dhahe tāv avinābhāvasya niyamād iti trividhahetuvyatirikteṣv artheṣv avinābhāvābhāvād ity arthaḥ). Cf. also tasya niyamaḥ in NBṬ 100,10.
26 Thereby, by the way, deviating from his own interpretation of it in PVSVṬ 8,28 as a genitive-tatpuruṣa (triṣv evāvinābhāvasya niyatatvād ity arthaḥ), which he may have copied, however, inattentively from Śākyabuddhi (PVṬ 7a8).
27 Karṇakagomin's conjecture "that Dharmakīrti refutes the niyama fragment by devising the compound 'avinābhāvaniyama' to distinguish his own concept of niyama from that of Kumārila" (K 2007: 1097, n. 62 ) cannot be taken as necessarily reflecting Dharmakīrti's intentions with regard to the compound.
limitation, restriction to something, and (3) niyama as a term for the logical nexus, synonymous with avinābhāva or vyāpti.
(1) Dharmakīrti and his "Sautrāntika" background (cf. Ch 2007) make it obvious that the essence or nature (svabhāva) of something is an effect of its causes. The effect's nature is conditioned in all its discernible aspects by the causes, but only some of its aspects are conditioned in such a way that they are also necessarily connected with something else, be it a different entity (or better: certain properties in a different entity) or a different property of the same entity. Further, it is also clear that the logical nexus, the inseparable connection (avinābhāva) of something with something else as based on real relationships in the form of causality or real identity is conditioned by its causes. In that sense I agree with the Yoshimizus that the causes "restrict" the nature of something to being inseparably connected with something else. In this sense an inseparable connection may be said to result from a restricting function of the causes. But it is at this point that the use of the causal function of the term "restriction" as elaborated in Ch forthc. ends: the inseparable connection (avinābhāva) is a fact created with restrictive force by the causes of those real entities in regard to which concepts can be correctly determined by means of inference.
(2) When Dharmakīrti defines the logical reason in PV 1.1 and determines this reason to be of three kinds only, he also states that the cause for this limited number of possible reasons is the fact that an inseparable connection is restricted to only these three (avinābhāvaniyamāt). Here the term "restriction" (niyama) is used in its formal meaning of expressing the limitation of something, the avinābhāva, in its occurrence to the three kinds of logical reasons.
(3) Kumārila, in his Bṛhaṭṭīkā, has yet another use for the term "restriction" (niyama). He substitutes it for the term avinābhāva which he had used in the Ślokavārttika, 28 and understands this niyama to be the logical nexus between "two coexisting things", without indicating whether this nexus is based on a particular kind of relationship in reality (K 2007: 1097) . 29 28 For possible reasons for this substitution cf. K forthc., with n. 43, and 2007: 1086f., 1097 with n. 94. 29 In another context, however, Kumārila seems to think of "relations" (sambandha) of the kind offered in the Ṣaṣṭitantra as possible candidates (K 2007: 1098, n. 64 ). In addition, it is also possible that Kumārila had these "relations" in mind when he says, in the second stanza of the "niyama fragment" (PVSVṬ 87,23; cf. Steinkellner 1997: To sum up my understanding of the most creative period in the development of Indian logic after reading these remarkable and profound papers: In my opinion, for their ideas on the logical nexus, Indian logicians always had in mind a foundation in reality. Only when Dignāga concentrated on the formal aspects of the logical reason did this basic assumption recede into the background for some time; this is evident even in the Ślokavārttika when Kumārila criticizes Dignāga's ways but keeps to the formal aspects of an "anvaya-vyatireka" logic. Soon, however, and perhaps initiated by Kumārila's change from the term avinābhāva to niyama, and certainly by Īśvarasena's attempts to solve the induction problem by means of formal conditions alone, reality was brought forth again by Dharmakīrti when he founded the inseparable logical connection (avinābhāva) on the "essential connections" (svabhāvapratibandha) of causality and real identity. 
